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ENVIRONMENTAL FAUST SUCCUMBS TO
TEMPTATIONS OF ECONOMIC
MEPHISTOPHELE$, OR, VALUE BY ANY
OTHER NAME IS PREFERENCE
Carol M. Rose*

THE EcONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT. By Mark Sago.ff. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1988. Pp. x, 271. $29.95.
In several of the chapters to his new book, Mark Sagoff begins by
telling some story to frame the remainder. One of these is particularly
significant for the book: Sagoff retells a New Yorker joke in whfoh the
Devil tells the new entrants to Hell that they are leaving right and
wrong behind, and entering a world of mere preferences (p. 99). The
Devil signifies for Sagoff the economics-oriented policy analyst, and
the story is prophetic because by the end of the book, that old preference-counting Devil has caught up with Sagoff.
· The word "environment" appeared in the titles of several of the
~arlier essays on which· the book is based, 1 but the book has wisely
subordinated that E-word to a subtitle; despite the frequent invocation
of natural wonders and scenic areas, the book doesn't really focus on
the environment until the last chapter. Nope, this book is about that
other E-word, Economics, which is so favored by the Devil. More
specifically, at least until that last chapter, the book is about how devilishly daffy economists are when they talk about the environment.
Sagoff thinks their clever confusions are at best distracting and at
worst antidemocratic (pp. 10, 95-97), and if we don't watch out, they
are going to lead us off the ethical path and straight down the road to
perdition.
Up to the book's end, only an occasional grudging concession2 relieves the hellfire-and-brimstone economics-bashing. Consequently,
dear Reader, you will be ill-prepared for that last chapter where, lo
and behold!, it turns out that the true path to environmental paradise
is through tradeable emission rights (pp. 209-10). What? What?
Tradeable emission rights have been pushed for years by those diaboli• Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1962, Antioch College; M.A.
(Political Science) 1963, University of Chicago; Ph.D. (History) 1969, Cornell University; J.D.
1977, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. P. x (listing earlier history).
2. See, e.g., pp. 71-73.
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cal economists; 3 so you may well put this book down with the thought
that somebody has been hoodwinked into a pact with the Devil - or
at least that, as with Faust, two souls struggle, ach, within the author's
breast.
This book, like Sagoff 's work generally, will quite rightly interest
many people who are looking for fresh approaches to environmental
issues. But at least some readers will be disconcerted or confused by
the book's odd internal tension, and so I want to look at each side of
the duality more carefully. I am going to focus first on the (anti-economic) soul of the book. Then I will turn to the other soul, and particularly to the implications of the last chapter's concessions to tradeable
pollution rights. Finally, I will go back to the first and dominant soul,
to try to locate the source of the author's general dyspepsia about economics, because I think his own book suggests some more charitable
ways to think about the devilish dismal science in the environmental
context.
I.

NUMBER ONE SOUL ATTEMPTS TO CAST
OUT ECONOMIC DEVILS

Sagoff 's book sets up a number of oppositions or contrasts that will
be familiar to readers of his earlier articles. It is not hard to see that in
these oppositions, Sagoff wants to preserve the high ground for his
own "ethical" point of view. Here are the big ones:
Ethics vs. Economics (pp. 80, 92, 196)
[Public] Values vs. [Private] Preferences (pp. 9, 90)
Citizen vs. Consumer (pp. 7, 27, 53)
Deliberation vs. Dogmatism (pp. 12, 77)

Environmental issues, he says, have to do with the left-hand side
- ethics, values, citizens, and deliberation - and not with economics,
preferences, consumerism, or dogmatic pseudoscience. Now, can you
guess which side wears the white robes, and which side has the horns
and tail? If you don't get the message, you might try one of the author's narrative versions of the oppositions: for example, the contrast
between a "majestic million-year-old wilderness" on the one hand, and
"Disney playland[s]" and "commercial honky-tonk[s]" on the other. 4
3. For a recent discussion of the merits of such schemes, see Ackerman & Stewart, Re·
forming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-51, 1360-64 (1985), and authorities
cited therein (particularly at 1337 n.11) (response to Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Effi·
ciency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and ''Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 31 STAN.
L. REv. 1267 (1985)).
4. Pp. 52, 59-60. Some, including my colleague Mark Grady, who professes to have visited
the Magic Kingdom well over 200 times, may take offense at the implicit disparagement of Disney enterprises. I myself take offense at the totally misguided disparagement of honky-tonks. To
the connoisseur, the honky-tonk represents a charming mix of pedal steel guitars, wailin' tunes,
longneck beer bottles, and the Texas two-step, as in Hank Williams' classic lines, "If you got the
money, Honey/ I got the Ti-i-i-me/ We'll go honky-tonkin' and we'll have a time." Moreover,
the word draws out subtle arguments about gender roles, as in the controversy begun in Hank
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So just how high is this high ground that Sagoff is appropriating
for his left-hand side of the column? The best way to find out is to
think through the oppositions.
A. Ethics vs. Economics

After reading this book, I still don't quite know what this ethics
stuff is for Sagoff, or why he plays ethics off against economics. In
fact, Sagoff himself doesn't give the reader many clues about what he
is calling "ethical" until well into the book, when he starts to tell us
something about the "nonnative position" (p. 90). But it's still not so
clear; here and elsewhere he gives Kant pretty big play, 5 and it seems
that by "ethics" he means something like Kantian categorical imperatives, and that "ethics" have to do with actions that are right in themselves. Some of the time it sounds as if he doesn't include
consequentialism in the category of ethical thinking at all, 6 but then
again, he sometimes seems to approve of talk about the "good" as well
as the "right" (pp. 94, 155-58). It's all a bit murky.
Either way - whether "ethics" is about the right thing to do, or
about the good life - one might well ask: Why should either view be
opposed to economics? If you take the economists at their word, they
are quite happy to have you approach issues in either of those ways, or
in some other way if you like. They don't care if you want to do the
right thing, or alternatively, if you want to do the thing that will lead
to good results. They just want to know what everybody thinks are
the right things to do (or, if it's allowed, what everybody thinks are
Thompson's The Wild Side of Life ("I didn't know God made honky-tonk angels/ I might have
known you'd never make a wife") (Capital 1952), and responded to by Kitty Wells, It Wasn't
God Who Made Honky-tonk Angels (Decca 1952) (my emphasis). My thanks to Ronnie Pugh of
the Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum in Nashville for assistance on this point.
5. E.g.• pp. 44, 155-56.
6. For example, when Sagoff describes environmentalists as taking a "moral" position about
the environment, p. 154, which apparently precludes consideration of welfare-enhancement, he
has already contrasted his "moral" position to utilitarianism. P. 152. This would suggest that he
does not think utilitarianism or consequentialism is "ethical" or "moral." The same view seems
to be behind a rather odd argument he makes against the welfare economists' goal of efficiency.
He argues that this position is not really consequentialist or utilitarian at all, since it considers
expected utility rather than actual consequences. Pp. 104-07. He cites the case of poor Romeo's
purchase of poison, and his mistaken expectation of relative happiness from the transaction, to
show how a,ctual consequences diverge from expected ones. P. 105. An economist, of course,
might point out that Romeo's real problem was an insufficient market for information, but I will
put that to one side. What is odd about the argument is that any consequentialist ethic is based
on guesses about the future (i.e., expected outcomes), and of course runs the risk of mistakes
about actual outcomes. Indeed, Sagoff is repeating one of Kant's critiques of consequentialism
generally - that human beings' will is not directed at appropriate consequences in advance, and
that one does not know how one's supposedly utility-maximizing behavior will come out in fact.
See I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 27, 47-48 (f. Abbott trans. 1987) (people make mistakes about outcomes, can't know what will make them happy
and thus can't act on definite principles to achieve that end). If one rejects efficiency because it is
oriented to expected gains, one also rejects consequentialism generally - again suggesting that
Sagoff rejects consequentialism as an ethical position.
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good results). After they get an answer to those questions, economists
want to take a further step, to try to get the most of whatever it is that
people think is right (or good). 7
So clean air is what you think is right, or good? Great, says the
economist. Now, how good or right do you think it is? Do you think
having electricity is right too (perhaps because it's right to have light,
heat, and dialysis machines)? You do? That's great too. Now, electricity generation usually messes up some clean air, and this is where
the economists think they can be helpful: They think they can help
you to decide between two right actions if you can't do both, or, at
least, if you can't do all you want of both.
On this issue, they think, you're not going to get anyplace by saying that clean air and electricity are both good, or right, or really,
really, really tj.ght or good. When you can't have all you would like of
both, all that stuff is just palaver. You've got to ask the questions the
economists ask: Which course do you think is better, and at what
levels? How much clean air is better than how much electricity?
That's what economists are trying to find out when they ask those
annoying questio"ns about how much you would pay for environmental
goods, or values, or whatever. They aren't telling you what to value,
but are trying to find out what you do value, and how much, by comparison to other things you value.
Sagoffmakes a big deal of the way people get mad sometimes when
economists ask them those weird questions about how much they
would pay for environmental goods like clean air and wilderness (pp.
83-84). He takes these reactions as a signal that economists aren't
thinking about the environment as citizens would, that is, in an ethical
way. But what's the big surprise if people get mad at those kinds of
questions? None of us likes the news that the preservation of one resource may come at the cost of something else. We dislike that news
most of all when we were thinking that at least some of our favorite
resources were free. But then, that's why we have environmental
problems, isn't it? Here we were, humming along with the happy
thought that the best things in life are free, and using up air and wilderness with the reckless abandon we reserve for "free" goods. Now,
along comes some squinty-eyed economist with a lot of questions
about how much we would pay for those things. No wonder everybody wants to shoot the messenger. Pay? For air? For the great outdoors? Who is this bozo?
7. See Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criti·
cisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 450-52 (1975). Sagoff(e.g., at 43, 45-46) thinks that this kind of neutrality neglects the difference between political values and personal preferences. See, e.g., pp. 43, 4546; see also infra text accompanying note 33. But Dan Farber, who rejects Sagoff's values/
preferences dichotomy, points out that rioneconomists may be persuaded on grounds of political
theory to share the economists' neutrality on values. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 u. ILL. L. REV. 337, 350-51.
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He's the successor to Adam Smith, that's who. And before you do
shoot the messenger, just remember, he doesn't have anything against
Immanuel Kant, whatever Sagoff might think; he just wants to know
how the Kantian aspirations come out when they conflict at the margin, in this vale of tears called scarce resources. Remember, when the
economist asks those creepy questions about paying, he's not trying to
tell you what you should or shouldn't value; he's just asking what you
do value, and how much, so that he can help you figure out how to get
the most of what you do value, when your values can't all be satisfied
at once. 8 What's the matter with that? Surely you don't want to have
or do less of whatever things your ethics tell you are the right things to
have and do.
So Sagoff's opposition, Ethics vs. Economics, doesn't look all that
convincing as an opposition after all. Through the book, Sagoff drops
a few hints that he may not quite believe in it himself, 9 and by the last
chapter, he seems to tank it altogether. 10 How about the other
oppositions?
B.

Values vs. Preferences; Citizen vs. Consumer

These two oppositions are so closely intertwined that I have to d~
with them together. Early in the book, one noti~s that Sagoff rails at
economists for failing to take environmental "values" into account,
and th~n he turns around and rails at them even more when they try
to do just that. 11 The poor economists: First everybody said they ignored nonmarket goods, like wildlife and mountainous scenery; and
no"'. here is Sagoff telling them they are imbeciles and rogues for trying to translate those nonmarket goods into a cost-benefit calculation
for decisionmakers. What's going on here?
What's going on, Sagoff says, is that tfConomists want to talk about
environmental matters as ifthey were (private) "preferences," when
they really are (public) "values" (p. 93). When people talk about the
environment, he says, they aren't talking about y.rhat they prefer for
private consumption; they are talking, as citizens, about the things
that have vatue for the whole community (p. 94). So you can't just do
a cost-benefit analysis of envirorunep.tal values, as if you ~ere adding
8. Note that the tradeolfs are not just between, say, industry ~d clean, air, but also among
industry-with-some-co!!l-scrubbers, sort-of-clean air, and a lot of other things we want. You can
have some industry, and some clean air, if you pay for the scrubbers, and you can have even
cleaner air if you pay for more scrubbers, but the scrubbers themselves aren't costless. They,
divert resources, talent, and worktime that might have contributed to other activities, such as
constructing violins or firiding a vaccine for AIDS.
9. See, e.g., pp. 71-72 (perfect enviionmental purity may give 'way to other considerations); p.
80 ("We must acknowledge, however idealistic we may be, that clean air, workplace safety, and
the like have a price .. , .").
10. Pp. 195-224. See infra text at notes 26-28.
11. E.g.• pp. 9-10, 27, 35-39, 90-91.
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up what people say they would pay for a pastrami sandwich. With the
environment, they are talking about what is valuable for the community as a whole, not their private preferences.
Now, get ready, because here comes the clincher: Mixing up these
discourses, Sagoff says, is a "category mistake" (p. 92). "Category
mistake"? My Irish grandfather, who sold liquor, would have said,
"Darlin', when they say somethin' fancy like that, close the cash register." But I will take the risk of leaving the register open for the time
being, and take up the point.
The point is, I don't. know where this alleged category mistake
happens. Or if there is some mistake, it is a mistake that is thoroughly
embedded in ordinary discourse; and this makes it a little harder to see
as a mistake in the first place, at least for somebody like Sagoff, who
professes to reject dogmatic versions of knowledge in favor of Richard
Rorty's kibbitzing approach. 12
Let me unpack this:
(i) Just for starters, why does Sagoff seem to think that public values are a matter of discussion, while private preferences aren't, and are
just hanging there like lurking components of an idiot id? Surely preferences - including consumer preferences - are educable. 13 Once
educated, we may start to call preferences "tastes," but the point remains: One can educate one's preference for movies, beer, music, and
all the rest. Moreover, people routinely do so through discussion with
other people.
For argument's sake, let's go along with Sagoff's view that one's
liking for ski areas is a private or consumer "preference," as opposed
to the public "value" in one's yen for wilderness (p. 52). Surely people
can educate their liking for either ski areas or wildernesses, and surely
they can learn to like one more than the other. It hardly seems a
"category mistake" to see both consumer preferences and so-called
public values as learned, and educable, desiderata.
(ii) More generally, why does he think there is some qualitative
difference between public values and private preferences? People mix
up private and civic concerns all the time, and put them all in the same
hopper. Sagoff's students, who valiantly chose wilderness despite
their fondness for ski resorts (pp. 52, 70-73), may well have wanted
both wilderness and ski areas, but they may just have wanted wilderness more, and chose wilderness when they knew they couldn't have
12. Pp. 12, 222. See also text at notes 22-2S. Rorty himself describes his approach to knowledge as "conversation," and also uses the phrase "useful kibitzing." See R. RORTY, PHILOSO·
PHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 391, 393 (1979) (rejecting epistemological notions of
mirroring truth, in favor of more open-ended conversation).
13. Sagolf does acknowledge that private tastes may be educable, p. 104, but most of his
discussion sharply distinguishes individual values on public matters, which are shared and discussed with others, from the personal preferences that seem to be undiscussed and amoral. See,
e.g., pp. SS, 100, 104.
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both in one place. 14 But they are still considering the two not as qualitatively separate categories, but as alternative good things.
It is no big secret that people think and talk about a lot of public
and private matters as alternative goods. Take for example a citizen's
reaction to a proposal for a new sidewalk. assessment. She thinks, in
rapid succession: (1) Gee, a new sidewalk would look great in front of
the house; and (2) it would make the whole block look spiffier, and
give the neighborhood a boost; but (3) it does sound kind of expensive
for my budget; and (4) it is really going to take a bite out of old Mrs.
Jones' pension.
This is an entirely normal progression of thinking about civic decisions. Does anyone except Sagoff really think that there is some sharp
divider between the "public" and the "private" aspects of these reflections, or that some of these aspects are inappropriate to the citizenry's
deliberations on matters of public importance?l 5
(iii) To illustrate the supposed category mistake in mixing preferences with values, Sagoff occasionally poses a cute hypothetical:
Someone who is promoting a particular public policy is asked how
much he would pay to have his policy put into place (pp. 9-10, 223).
The very question is supposed to illustrate that it is ridiculous to mix
preference-talk with value-talk.
Well, one can agree that this would normally be an odd sort of
question, but one still wouldn't have to concede that there is some
absurdity in policymakers' consideration of preferences. For one
thing, sad to say, sometimes policymakers are thinking about how
much they would pay, or to put it on the other side of the Coase theorem, how much they are getting paid for taking particular public policy positions. That is to say, they are thinking about their own
consumer preferences when they support certain public policies, because someone is going to pay them for supporting those public
policies. 16 .
Naturally, we think this is wrong. But it isn't wrong because the
legislators are thinking about preferences as such. · It is wrong because
they are thinking about the wrong people's preferences - they are sup14. Or maybe in this class, they thought they would be well advised to want wilderness more.
15. For another critique of Sagoff's division of personal and civic values, see Farber, supra
note 7, at 344, 347. Cass Sunstein, some of whose work Sagoffapprovingly cites, pp. 10-11, does
distinguish public and private spheres but does not qualitatively distinguish private preferences
from civic values; he rather speaks of levels of preferences, noting that we may have preferences
about preferences: we wish we didn't like to smoke, we wish we were more inclined to wear seat
belts, etc. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129,
1140 (1986).
16. According to some law-and-economics commentators, that seems to be all that legislators
are thinking about, whether they decide for or against legislation. See McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101, 102-03
(1987) (politicians seek to maximize their own ret1:,1rns by forbearing from regulation costly to
others).
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posed to be thinking about their constituents' preferences and not their
own. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued, the legislator who accepts
a bribe violates an agency relationship with his constituents, because
he is supposed to be thinking about the constituents' preferences,' and
instead he is thinking about his own.17 But the legislator still should
be thinking about preferences - that is, those of his constituents. If
he isn't, he may not be in office too long, because those constituents
are certainly considering consumer preferences when they think about,
say, whether they want a bond issue to fund the public schools, or
whether they want to clean up the roadsides at the expense of paying a
bottle deposit, and how they want their representat~ve to vote on those
matters. 18 This is not to say that private consumption preferences are
the only thing that citizens (or their representatives) think about with
respect to public affairs, but it is one of the things they think about.
What we really may want from our political leaders is some education
of our preferences in matters relating to public affairs; after all, they
are in office, and are supposed to have the time to think about these
things and explain them to -the rest of us working stiffs. But citizens
and policymakers don't take a vacation from preferences and utility
maximization jqst because they are talking about public issues.
So where's the category mistake in mixing up citizens' values and
consumers' preferences? I think I've lost it. Moreover, I think most
people never dreamed of it. Ordinary language mixes these up, and
treats all of them as appropriate grist in the political "deliberation" or
"conversation" 19 about public decisions, whether they be environmental or something else.
Despite all this, Sagoff is clearly right that there probably is .one
important sense in which community goals may diverge from the sum
of individual preferences. Take public health, for example: Individual
health has repercussions beyond the healthy individual, not only because the healthy person doesn't infect others, but also because she
holds a job, plays on the neighborhood softball team, acts cheerful,
and in general passes on some nice positive externalities to others. But
because some of these good things are externalities, she might be
17. s. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTION: A STUDY IN PoLmCAL EcONOMY (1978). See
also Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 587
(1975). Sagoffprofesses to have some experience with bribes, p. 52, and might object that bribing
a judge is different, because a judge is not supposed to be thinking about constituent preferences.
But a judge should be thinking about constituents' "preferences about preferences," as these are
incorporated into the rules of behavior that constituents have given themselves. See Sunstein,
supra note 15.
18. When Sagoff suggests that costs are unimportant by saying, for example, that mainte·
nance of the national parks in the face of economic progress is an ethical, and not an economic,
issue, he may be understating the significance of cost considerations in political decisions. See,
e.g., Girdner, Timber War Pits Law Students vs. Laggers, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1988, at 53, col.
3 (describing local opposition to student efforts to preserve old-growth forestS).
19. "Conversation" is from Richard Rorty, whom Sagoff cites approvingly. See supra note
12.
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tempted to scrimp on expenditures for her own health. And the same
goes for everyone else in the community: taken in the aggregate, individuals might not put enough resources into things that are beneficial
not just to themselves, but to everybody else too. But the community
as a whole will be better off with a higher level of expenditure. The
more general point is that the community as a whole has objectives
that may differ from the sum of individual wishes; perhaps this was
what Rousseau had in mind with all the pluses and minuses in the
"general will." 20 On these matters, we want citizens and legislators to
pay attention to common goods and evils, which do diverge from aggregated individual preferences.
This is not news in the literature from economics and economicsinfluenced branches of political science. On the contrary, there is a
whole body of work out there about public goods and positive sum
cooperative "games," and though not all of it is written by creepy neoclassical economists, economists have certainly had some influence on
the discussion. 21 · It is a pity that Sagoff does not seem to have addressed this work, for two reasons. First, some of this literature offers
some reasons for the public preservation of the environmental goods
that Sagoff rightly thinks are so important. And second, this literature
poses very important political questions about how people might get
over the impulses they have to act self-interestedly, under circumstances where narrow self-interest is inappropriate, and· why they
might cooperate instead for a greater common good - questions that
seem to me to be central to Sagoff 's interest in public values. I will
come back to this later.
C. Deliberation vs. Dogma

I am not going to say much about this opposition here. It's now
quite trendy to describe one's opponents as snapping their chops over
dogmatic scientism, while describing oneself as engaging in deliberation or conversation, where the participants are civil and openminded. 22 No doubt deliberation is a good thing. ·But here it looks a
20. William Ophuls, in the context of his discussion of the "tragedy of the commons," notes
the relationship between Rousseau's "general will" and the divergence between community good
and additive individual preferences. w. OPHULS, EcOLOGY AND THE POLmCS OF SCARCITY:
PROLOGUE TO A PoLmCAL THEORY OF THE STEADY STATE 150-51 (1977). Sagotr also mentions Rousseau, although he does not give the same reasons for the difference between individual
and common goals. P. 11.
21. See, e.g., R. DORFMAN, MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS 4-5
(1965); R. HARDIN, CoLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); Hirschleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RE.s. L. & EcoN. 1 (1982); Schelling,
Hockey Helmets, Daylight Saving, and Other .Binary Choices, in MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 211 (1978).
22. For a witty example, see "D.A.F." [D. Farber], The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 13, 14-16 (1988) (complains about law review articles' excessive length and footnotes as
attempts to have last word instead of engaging in "conversation" a la Richard Rorty).
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little like a trick, because the reader never does get much of a sense of
what the deliberation is supposed to be about. In fact, it looks as if the
deliberation isn't supposed to be about anything in particular. 23
Dressing up a nonposition as "deliberation" seems like thin stuff, and
not much more than another effort to lay claim to the high ground sort of like opposing gorgeous scenery to honkytonks. Yeah, yeah,
maybe the economics crowd does tout itself as predictive scientists, 24
but it doesn't sound very civil and open-minded to say they are just
making "category mistakes" either - in fact, the very phrase sounds
like the kind of Intimidator Ray Gun that philosophers whip out to
shut up everybody else. 25 Now, I do think there is more to Sagoff's
claim to "deliberation" than just posturing, and I'll come back to it,
but I don't think Sagoff has spelled it out well enough to do justice to
his own position vis-a-vis those economic devils.
Maybe that's why they get him by the end of the book.
II.

NUMBER Two SOUL GIVES IN TO TRADEABLE
EMISSION RIGHTS

A kind of diabolical conversion occurs in the last chapter of this
book, where Sagoff puts in a plug for tradeable emission rights those inventions of economic environmentalists. 26 The tradeable emission right idea (which I will call TER) is now a familiar one. In this
scheme, we start by setting overall ambient limits for any given pollutant, first by guessing about our health-based and aesthetic tolerance
to the pollutant, and then by weighing those factors against our need
for products that require the pollutant, and other costs incurred in
restraining it. After we have made these calculations and set upper
limits, would-be polluters can get permits to pollute, but they have to
bid and trade for these now-scarce entitlements. This makes polluters
more cost-conscious and more likely to find ways to cut back on their
pollution, but we leave it to them to figure out the most cost-effective
ways to do so; this is presumably cheaper and more flexible than
would be our own efforts to try to figure out controls for them.
In my view, Sagoff's chapter bringing up this approach is among
the most sensible and interesting parts of his book, because it is the
one place where he starts to reckon with the problem of scarce resources, and with the difficulties of allocating and restraining uses of
23. E.g., pp. 215-16.
24. See White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1967-68 (1987) (economists, as example of "conceptual" thinking, may see role as putting forth verifiable hypotheses in
manner of science).
25. Not that economists are easy to shut up - they've got some ray guns of their own, like
"cross-elasticity." What could be more of a silencer than that? - maybe the lit-crit crowd's
phronesis, or trope, or aporia. For a comment on "fancy scholarship" in the law, see Schlag,
Comment: The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. R.Ev. 917 (1987).
26. See supra note 3.
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resources that are normally seen as "commons." But I think his endorsement of the TER idea creates some problems for his position
about environmental values, and that TER really undermines the
whole set of oppositions that inform the bulk of the book. The basic
problem is that the structure of tradeable emission rights serves up
values and ethics right along with mere low-life consumer preferences.
In a TER regime, everything is on the menu, and everything gets
traded off with everything else.
Sagoff likes TER, because he says that one can base the overall
pollution standards on ethical considerations, like health and aesthetics (pp. 210, 213). And indeed one can. But as he seems to realize
(pp. 197-98), nobody has to do this - there is nothing in the TER
concept that privileges "ethical" environmental concerns over "consumer" concerns about, say, the cost of pollution controls. 27 What
does this mean? 'rt means that on the level of setting the overarching
pollution limits, my private "preference" for keeping my dollars in my
pocket gets into the same discussion with Sagoff's high ethical "value"
for spending my consumer dollars to clean up duckponds in Arkansas.
Is his ethical choice going to trump my personal preference? Nope.
He may win or he may lose, but in principle, under a TER regime, the
setting of overall pollution levels need not give his environmental ethics any special place. Instead, a TER regime tries to figure out how
much his ethical values are worth, vis-a-vis my low-life preference for
cash.
There's another way that TER-thinking messes up the purported
opposition between values and preferences. Let's suppose that ethical
values do have some privileged position at the policy level - that is,
let's suppose they do count a bunch when we are setting overall stand'ards, in the sense that we damn the costs in order to get, say, healthful air. Parenthetically, I agree with Sagoff that a lot of legislation
does this, though perhaps not so much as he suggests.28 But even sup27. Indeed, costs - especially the costs of "do-your-best," technology-based pollution control devices - have been one of the major impulses for turning to TER-type approaches. See
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 1338-40; Note, Technology-Based Emission and EjJ/uent
Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982)
(criticizing performance standards as costlier and less beneficial than pollution-rights approaches); see also Krier & Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of
Government Intervention, 13 NAT. REsOURCES J. 89, 99-101 (1973) (suggesting that interest in
pollution pricing/trading schemes stems from lower costs of those schemes). TER schemes do
have their critics; see Latin, supra note 3 (arguing that pollution entitlement schemes are practically unmanageable and undermine more feasible environmental control efforts based on technology). Costs, of course, may be seen either as fiat cash, or (in more sophisticated versions) as the
diversion of resources and related lost consumption opportunities.
28. Sagoff often refers to sections of environmental or health statutes in which the legislatures or the courts have stated that costs will not be counted, to suggest that costs are seldom or
never considered in environmental laws. See, e.g.• pp. 36 (discussing Clean Air Act, Endangered
Species Act), p. 84 (discussing Clean Air Act, OSHA), p. 197 (discussing several statutes). This
gives a misleading impression. There are a number of statutory sections where costs are specifically mentioned. To give one example, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, dealing with uniform federal
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posing that "values" rule at the standard-setting level, TER still takes
the economists' position of agnosticism about values at a lower level.
This means that if Sagoff and I both get a small allocation of the few
tradeable pollution rights that are allowed, he can hoard his (to protect the air, which he values so highly). I will be delighted, because he
is limiting an already-scarce supply even more, and making my pollution rights even more marketable. Because of his noble self-sacrifice, I
can get an extra bundle when I sell my now-even-scarcer pollution
rights to the styrofoam cup makers. Shoot, maybe I can get enough to
finance a trip to Disneyland, and surely enough to go honkytonk-hopping. What do I say to Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative?
Hey, take gas, Manny Baby.
The point is that if I can act this way under a TER regime, then
the TER regime swallows up Sagoff 's ethical and public values in the
great maw of economic devilry. What's notable about the book is that
by the end, Sagoff seems to have fallen at least as far as the First
Circle.
Ill.

REDEMPTION THROUGH RHETORIC

So what is ailing our Faust, anyway? Why does he bum so hotly
about economics, when he concedes so much? I think that what's gettmg to Sagoff is the rhetoric of economic discussion, not its category
mistakes.
Sagoff does not say this in so many words, but he implies that one
aspect of economic rhetoric is me-first-ism.29 For all the supposed indifference to goals in economics, preference-talk has the sound of an
irreducible egotism, and implies that preference bearers, in their endcontrols on stationary pollution sources, requires the Administrator to set performance standards
based on the best available technological controls for emission reductions, "taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction," as well as other health, environmental and
energy considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(l)(C) (1982). Sagoff himself notes in passing the cost
considerations in this and other sections, p. 201, but only in his last-chapter conversion to taking
costs seriously. And even there, when he directly quotes this section, he omits its reference to
costs. Pp. 201, 207-08, 211. But cost considerations do come into play repeatedly in this and
other areas of environmental law, despite grand statutory prefaces about eradication of pollution;
the Clean Water Act, for example, makes a number of concessions to cost considerations, such as
the provisions that permit the states to determine varying levels of water cleanliness for varying
purposes, including agricultural and industrial purposes. See Clean Water Act, § 303(c)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982). The "Superfund" statute provides for a National Contingency Plan
to set priorities for responses to hazardous substance releases, and requires that relative magnitudes of danger be taken into account as well as costs of remedies. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
As noted above, the recent interest in emission-rights approaches is closely related to concerns
that environmental regulation may be costlier than necessary. See supra note 27. For some
observations on the relation of control costs to environmental benefits in environmental law, see
Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,208
(1986) (discussing a "risk portfolio" approach).
29. See, e.g., pp. 55-56 (suggesting that economists disregard or attempt to paper over nonself-regarding choices).
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less pulse-checking for their own preferences, really don't give two
hoots about what their neighbors might want or need. Now, maybe
this is a mistaken notion of what economists think, but mistaken or
not, the rhetoric matters: If all this preference-talk gives you the idea
that you are alone in caring about the neighbors, you may be less willing to act in their behalf. Why be the sucker when the rest of them are
all out for themselves?30 That sort of attitude, of course, leads everybody down the primrose path to the old Prisoner's Dilemma, the ultimate noncooperative end to what should be a cooperative game, the
point where me-first-ism impoverishes all the players. 31
Environmental problems are often commons problems, and thus
they present just such Prisoner's Dilemma "games"; 32 and insofar as
this is true, as I mentioned earlier, the big task is to induce people to
cooperate for the common good. In that task, it doesn't always help to
have a very powerful rhetoric suggesting that charity and fellow-feeling, while just as good as any other preferences, are really not to be
expected - so get yours while you can.
That is one rhetorical aspect of economic talk that may be getting
under Sagoff's skin. I am less tentative about saying that he is bothered by a second rhetorical aspect: that is, the purported economic
agnosticism about goals, which suggests that goals are all alike and
that there is not really much point in talking about them. 33 So you
like wilderness? says our economic poll-taker. Great - but let's not
talk about why. Sagoff, on the other hand, wants to say that you can
talk about these matters, and that there is something you can say to
shape goals. 34
·
On this point, although I disagree with Sagoff's sharp opposition
between preferences and values, I think he is on to something. People
do talk about the things they want; they change their minds as a result
of discussion; they have informed views on what is desirable and why;
they talk about traditions and practicalities - and this discussion puts
them into a kind of fellowship with other participants in it, including
those with whom they disagree on any particular issue. In this sense,
Sagoff is not just being trendy in his appeal to Rorty and "deliberation" or "persuasion." 35 When I want to sell my pollution rights to
30. On a related point, see Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1849, 1877-87
(1987) (rhetoric of commodification may distort perceptions and attitudes about relationships
among people).
31. For this much-discussed "game," see R. HARDIN, supra note 21, at 24; Hirshleifer, supra
note 21, at 13-14.
32. See W. OPHULS, supra note 20, at 145-47.
33. Sagoff focuses on this point at pp. 45-46 (cost-benefit analysis indifferent to values) and
pp. 40-41, 80-81 (economists treat goals as "exogenous," to be toted up by "appropriate
software").
34. E.g., p. 120.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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the plastics factory, maybe Sagoff and I can talk it over, and maybe he
can talk me out of it.
But how is he going to do that? The book is more than a bit frustrating on the things that go into our deliberation: What do we deliberate about, and especially, what kinds of topics will withstand the
economic rhetoric that suggests we won't really deliberate at all?
Sagoff's major way around this rhetoric is the appeal to "ethics" and
to all those other things on the left-hand side of the list of oppositions.
As I have said, I don't think these oppositions stand up very well. So
what other routes are there to redeem our Faust and get him out of
economic hell? What other counter-rhetorics might get around the
rhetoric of Me-First and No-Discussion?
One route Sagoff touches upon is the somewhat amorphous work
that has been classed as "deep ecology" - a set of writings characterized by their urging that we acknowledge a kind of feeling-in and feeling-with nature. 36 This is not preference-talk, but kinship-talk.
Sagoff's interesting chapter on the history of environmentalism brings
up this way of talking, pointing out the symbolic impact of nature in
our cultural history.37
It takes a lot of nerve to get into a discussion of kinship with nature, as the ideas can be easily pooh-poohed; 38 besides, it is not altogether clear that the concept - or feel - of deep ecology can be
conveyed adequately by argumentative discourse at all. As Sagoff suggests in his discussion of American literature, 39 this kind of insight
may only come through experience, or through artistic and narrative
renditions of experience - which may be the reason why people like
the photographer Ansel Adams and the storyteller Edward Abbey are
so important in environmental history. 40 Sagoff's discussion of an aesthetic or a narrative counter-rhetoric is an important contribution to
the environmental "discussion" - and in my view considerably more
provocative than his preferred argumentative rhetoric of "ethics."
A second route or counter-rhetoric is an expanded version of
rights. Sagoff mentions this route in his nods to libertarianism on the
one hand (p. 16) and to animal-rights advocates on the other (pp. 15657). Rights-talk is tricky, though, because rights and entitlements are
very much a part of the neoclassical economic baggage: Fixed and
firm entitlements, one might think, are only there in order to assist in
36. For a discussion of the various sources of this literature, see Devall, The Deep Ecology
Movement, 20 NAT. REsoURCES J. 299 (1980). See especially id. at 309 (deep ecology tries to
avoid focusing on human needs, instead tries "thinking like a mountain").
37. See ch. 6, "Nature and the National Idea,'' pp. 124-45, particularly pp. 141-44.
38. See, e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5-9
(1974) (rejects idea that nature has normative content aside from human preferences).
39. E.g., pp. 142-43.
40. See Devall, supra note 36, at 308; R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND
263-65 (3d ed. 1982).
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investment, trade, and all those Pareto-optimal moves in the Me-First
universe. 41 Maybe this explains why Sagoff himself is leery of rightstalk.42
But rights-talk has another rhetorical face as well. As Martha Minow has pointed out, by applying rights-talk to such unexpected subjects as children and the mentally disabled, one invites the listener to
take seriously their condition.43 These unorthodox subjects are not at
all the usual rights-bearers, who defend their own entitlements. But
the very metaphoric quality of rights-rhetoric, on behalf of those who
are somehow rights-disabled, bridges a gap to the more ordinary
rights-holder, and adds drama to the plea to consider their situation,
as if they could stand up for rights in a more conventional way. Thus
rights-talk may borrow the neoclassical rhetoric of entitlement, but
may turn that rhetoric around to lend gravity to the discussion of
novel subjects. Minow uses this rhetorical tum for children, but one
could do the same for animals and plants and places of breathtaking
beauty.
The tum-around in the rhetoric of rights suggests still another
kind of counter-rhetoric, one that Sagoff eschews, though I think perhaps too hastily. It is the counter-rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis,
which seems to me to have done a good deal to get us off the mark in
thinking about the desirable qualities of the natural environment.
Sagoff feels a monumental fury about the "shadow-pricing" of environmental benefits (pp. 88-92). He is right in a way; it does seem jarring to cost out, say, the scenery at Mt. Whitney.
But why shouldn't we see that shock as the same kind of shock
that comes with the discussion of trees having rights? 44 Why not see it
as an effort to bridge a gap, to dramatize the value of things that are
too easily ignored, to invite a discussion of the things we value, even
though the neoclassical market rhetoric seems deaf and dumb about
them? So what if we borrow that market language? We have to use
what we have, and this talk may help to disarm those who would simply ignore environmental values. More important, the very pirating of
41. See Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-78, 605-06
(1988); see also Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363, 1392-94 (1984) (rights-talk
is a part of capitalist culture and focuses on negative rights of individuals rather than positive
claims of those in need); cf. Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk nor the "Critique of Rights" Too
Seriously, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1405, 1415 (1984) (Tushnet offers no better alternative to rights
rhetoric to support claims of needy).
42. Sagoff, however, says that he rejects rights-talk in environmental law because the rights
concept is either inconsistent or overly rigid. See pp. 156-57.
43. See Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1866-67,
1892-93, 1907-08, 1910-11 (1987) (second meaning of rhetoric of rights, inviting "conversation"
about unconventional claims).
44. See c. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECI'S (1974). For Stone's most recent effort, see c. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS:
THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987), which again focuses on the moral status of nonhuman things.
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market-talk adds to its metaphoric power when we use that talk to
dramatize things that are not bought and sold at all. It's a dangerous
game, to be sure, but the imaginative use of rhetoric may open up
some minds that would otherwise be closed.
The major problem of environmentalism is that we live in an imperfect world of limited resources: There just isn't enough of everything to have all we would like, or even all we think would be good for
us. But in talking about the environment, we realize that we live in a
limited rhetorical world, too. We can't talk about the natural surroundings as we no doubt romantically dream that the Native Americans did in olden times - with ease, grace, and transparent
understanding of the awe and loveliness of the earth and its creatures.
Instead, we have all this pinched yakking about what's mine, and
what's yours, and how much you are going to have to pay me if you
want to get what's mine. But there are ways to build on this rhetoric,
ways to move out from under its limitations.
Sagoff's book gropes toward a different rhetoric, and while he concentrates on his sharp distinctions between ethics and economics, I
think he makes a much more substantial contribution with his brief
discussion of narrative and artistic renderings of the experience of nature. Still, my chief concern is that he is neglecting the rhetorical resources that are available in other standard ways of talking. On the
subject of economics in particular, his book sends the very mixed but still rather conventional -· signals of sin and salvation. A less
belligerent exploration, on the other hand, might have opened up some
more creative rhetorical possibilities in the language of rights, entitlements, and even costs and benefits. But whatever the price the book
pays to its own Manicheanism, it does make some important contributions, and I have to hand it to Sagoff: What he has done better than
anybody else so far is to point out that the way we talk about the
environment is going to influence the way we think about it, and the
things we do about it.

